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Poland is arguably the leading example of successful democratization and Westernization 
within Central and Eastern Europe. This thesis explores how Poland’s participation in 
Western security structures has enabled it to reintegrate into Europe, emerging as one of 
the most politically influential and economically successful democratic nations from the 
former communist bloc.  
The steps and milestones of Poland’s accession to membership in NATO and the 
European Union, along with Poland’s participation in the Weimar Triangle, provide 
insight into Poland’s military, economic, and political transformations since 1991. This 
thesis analyzes Poland’s dramatic increase in participation in these Western security 
institutions and identifies where Poland has taken on a leadership role. In addition, this 
thesis explores to what extent Poland is likely to deepen its integration in each institution 
in the foreseeable future. 
This thesis concludes that one reason for Poland’s successful integration into the 
West is the country’s pursuit of membership in Western security institutions. Enrollment 
in these organizations required Poland to accomplish a drastic domestic overhaul 
affecting all sectors and levels of government. The result is that Poland now stands as a 
stable democratic nation in a region where such an outcome was not inevitable. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis explores how Poland has been able to use Western security structures 
to effectively reintegrate into Europe, emerging as one of the more politically influential 
and economically successful democratic nations from the former communist bloc. The 
criteria for joining Western security structures such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) proved to be critical in assuring 
Poland’s prosperous transition to democracy and a Western economic model. This thesis 
also examines Poland’s critical interregional relationships, notably its trilateral 
partnership with France and Germany known as the Weimar Triangle, and explains how 
this unique organization also supported Poland’s return to the European mainstream.    
The specific steps and milestones of Poland’s acceptance into NATO and the EU, 
along with Poland’s participation in the Weimar Triangle, provide insight into Poland’s 
military, economic, and political transformations since 1991. This thesis analyzes 
Poland’s dramatic increase in participation with these Western security institutions and 
identifies where Poland has taken on a leadership role. In addition, this thesis explores to 
what extent Poland is likely to deepen its integration in each institution in the foreseeable 
future and how Poland has attempted to influence these strategic institutions to pursue 
policies directly in support of its national key priorities. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Poland is arguably the leading example of successful democratization and 
Westernization within Central and Eastern Europe. In less than 25 years, Poland has 
transitioned from functioning as a Soviet satellite state to charting its own course as a 
fully independent and integrated nation within the European Union. Unfortunately, other 
states within the region have not fared as well, with the current situation in Ukraine being 
a prime example. It is critical to examine Poland’s successful Westernization in order to 
understand exactly how this transformation occurred and, in doing so, provide a possible 
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roadmap for other Central and Eastern European countries that are struggling to make 
similar political and military adjustments. 
In addition, an analytical review of Poland’s transformation from a communist 
country to an ardent United States ally is vital to U.S. leadership. Poland has proven to be 
a strong supporter of U.S. interests. If the United States intends to maintain this valuable 
allegiance, its policy makers must understand the implications of dealing with Poland. 
From the perspective of the Unites States, Poland may be a relatively small country. 
However, its geographic location and increasing regional influence place Poland in a 
unique position to support American interests within an unpredictable portion of Europe. 
The United States must also remain mindful of Poland’s expectations from this bilateral 
relationship. As a country on the eastern fringe of NATO and the EU, Poland is 
constantly looking for additional security guarantees in the event future Russian imperial 
aspirations should lead Moscow to undertake coercion or aggression.1  Issues such as 
missile defense and U.S. basing play a prominent role in Polish domestic politics and 
strategic policy.2 
Finally, key members within the security institutions that Poland has joined, 
notably NATO and the EU, should understand how Poland has been affected through 
these memberships. Recent versions of Poland’s National Security Strategy and National 
Defense Strategy tell the story of what role Poland expects to play within each 
organization and how exactly Poland plans to fulfil its new obligations. As NATO has 
supplemented its collective defense mission with the additional core tasks of crisis 
management and cooperative security within and beyond Europe, and as the EU has 
expanded its scope of ambition into the realm of a Common Security and Defense Policy 
(CSDP), Poland has been forced to adapt to these new challenges politically and 
militarily. Equally important is an analysis of how Poland has managed to influence 
NATO and the EU. This thesis investigates how and to what extent Poland has attempted 
                                                 
1 Krzysztof Bobinski, “Poland and Eastern Europe,” in European Foreign Policies: Does Europe Still 
Matter? ed. Ronald Tiersky and John Van Oudenaren (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 
274. 
2 Andrew A. Michta, “Polish Hard Power: Investing in the Military as Europe Cuts Back,” American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, no. 7 (December 2013), 6. 
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to steer these organizations in directions consistent with Poland’s national priorities and 
interests. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The end of the Cold War was seen as a great victory for Western societies, but it 
did not manage to create a more peaceful and stable world. On the contrary, the break-up 
of the Soviet Union created 15 new nations almost overnight and greatly complicated 
political relations across the continent. This was shortly followed by the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, adding another seven more countries to an already 
precarious region. While the dissolution of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia was relatively peaceful, the break-up of Yugoslavia into Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia showed 
the rest of Europe that this period of political transition would require external oversight 
and intervention. The problems that these new countries faced were not confined to 
domestic power struggles, and they had enduring implications for international security. 
According to David Yost, one problem specific to NATO since the end of the 
Cold War has been the requirement to “redefine NATO’s purposes and to endow it with 
new roles in addition to its traditional core missions of collective defense and dialogue 
with adversaries.”3  These new roles have not been clearly defined by NATO, but they 
can be broadly categorized as cooperation with former adversaries and other non-NATO 
countries, and operations conducted beyond the borders of NATO allies.4 In the 2010 
Strategic Concept, the Allies defined NATO’s new tasks in addition to collective defense 
as crisis management and cooperative security.5 
Another problem for NATO involves future enlargement of the alliance. How far 
is NATO willing to go and at what cost?  What kind of impact could enlargement have 
                                                 
3 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 72. 
4 Ibid. 
5 David S. Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2014), 171–172. 
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on future cohesion?  Will future enlargement be seen by Russia as a direct threat to 
Russian national security? 
Poland’s integration into the European Union also comes with a set of unique 
problems. As with NATO enlargement, EU expansion also comes at a cost, albeit more 
of an economic burden than a military one. Poland has proven itself to be a rare economic 
success story, but this still came at a substantial financial cost shared by other EU 
members.6 Since its admission in 2004, Poland has received over 40 billion euros from 
the EU.7  This money has largely gone toward major infrastructure upgrades, which have 
proven to be a worthwhile and productive investment for the EU.8 
Perhaps the most complicated problems stem from Russia and its historical 
influence over Poland. In 1989–1991 Poland made a clean break from the Warsaw Pact 
and communism. While Poland maintained economic and diplomatic relations with 
Russia, Warsaw looked west toward the European Union and the United States, and 
joined NATO and the EU. However, the deep-rooted ties that Poland had built with the 
dominant republic of the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1991 could not be so easily severed. 
The threat of an economic or energy backlash from Russia must always be considered by 
Polish politicians. Poland has thrown its support behind the United States in controversial 
decisions such as the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq because it hopes to prove itself as a 
faithful ally should Russian aggression arise again.9  U.S.-Polish cooperation in missile 
defense has also exacerbated tensions with Russia. 
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that one reason for Poland’s successful 
integration into the West is the country’s pursuit of membership in Western security 
institutions such as NATO, the EU, and the Weimar Triangle. Association with these 
organizations required Poland to accomplish a drastic domestic overhaul affecting all 
sectors and levels of government. The result of this reformation is that Poland now stands 
                                                 




9  Bobinski, “Poland and Eastern Europe,” 274. 
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as a stable and successful democratic nation in a region where such an outcome was not 
inevitable. 
Poland has, since 1991, not only sought membership in these key Western 
security institutions, but has also attempted to influence these institutions in the pursuit of 
critical national priorities. Despite the problems and concerns mentioned above, Poland 
resolutely sought to join these institutions as a guarantee for its national sovereignty. 
Poland appears to have prioritized two objectives: military preparedness for national and 
collective defense, and political solidarity with the leading states in these organizations. 
Both of these aims have been visible in Poland’s activities in NATO and the EU, as well 
as in its trilateral cooperation with France and Germany in the Weimar Triangle. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is no shortage of literature and information covering the end of the Cold 
War and resultant rebirth of many former Soviet bloc countries. With the enormous 
amount of material available on the subject, a methodical approach to narrow the focus to 
Poland’s subsequent integration in Western security structures will be applied. Sources 
for this thesis include other theses with a relevant theme, books written on the topic, 
applicable official government documents, and appropriate scholarly articles. 
A review of theses previously written at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
provided a solid foundation for understanding what portions of this topic have already 
been covered and identified gaps that need to be filled in order to make the scholarly 
literature more complete. Beata Gonzales’ 2011 thesis titled “NATO, Russia, Poland, and 
Ukraine: Perspectives on the Ukraine Candidacy for NATO Membership” provides a 
brief history of relevant policies in Poland in the post-communist reform period. 
Gonzales takes a close look at Polish—U.S. relations, describing in detail how the two 
countries have become close allies and identifying the impact of 9/11 on their 
relationship. Gonzales also provides a brief synopsis of how Poland positioned itself in 
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order to be accepted into NATO. This thesis delivers a unique perspective on the broad 
implications of NATO enlargement.10 
Jaroslaw Jablonski’s thesis “The Key Role of NATO Accession on Poland’s 
Democratic Transition” is slightly dated, having been written in 2002, but it provides a 
solid account of events during a specific period in Poland’s political transition. Jablonski 
finds that “among the obstacles to this process was a western ignorance about domestic 
social challenges and political conflicts.”11  This thesis highlights the effects of Western 
ignorance when dealing with post-Communist countries and also illuminates the 
challenges faced by Poland in the realm of civil-military relations. NATO’s requirement 
for democratic civilian control over the military became a major hurdle that Poland 
eventually overcame, but not before changing its political landscape.12 
Piotr Bieniek examines Polish defense policy in his 2006 thesis “Polish Defence 
Policy in the Context of National Security Strategy.”  Bieniek’s thesis analyzes Polish 
defense policy since Poland joined NATO and the EU, and discusses how it has been 
shaped not only through geography and history, but also through membership in—and 
responsibility to—these two organizations. This thesis also examines how Poland 
manages to keep a balance between pursuing its national interests and meeting the 
demands of its allies.13 
The three theses all contain relevant information on Poland’s integration in 
Western security structures, but none of them captures fully the scope of the security 
structures Poland is involved with or focuses much attention on Poland’s specific role 
                                                 
10 Beata I. Gonzales, “NATO, Russia, Poland, and Ukraine: Perspectives on the Ukraine Candidacy 
for NATO Membership” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/5692/11Jun_Gonzales.pdf?sequence=1. 
11 Jaroslaw Jablonski, “The Key Role of NATO Accession on Poland’s Democratic Transition” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002), 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/5076/02Sep_Jablonski.pdf?sequence=1. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Piotr S. Bieniek, “Polish Defense Policy in the Context of National Security Strategy” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/2795/06Jun_Bieniek.pdf?sequence=1. 
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within each Western security organization. Each study’s focus differs from that of this 
thesis. 
Several books have been authored on Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold 
War, NATO enlargement, and the emergence of the European Union as a security actor. 
Poland seems to have played a central role in each of these developments, often being 
influenced internally, and more recently, attempting to exert its own influence externally. 
In Poland and NATO: A Study in Civil-Military Relations Jeffrey Simon examines 
the difficulties that Poland endured during its political and military transition from 1989 
till the mid-1990s, when democratic stability finally seemed reliable. In order to obtain 
membership in NATO, Poland was forced to completely reform its political and military 
structure. Simon chronicles this journey, complete with many failures and achievements, 
and provides an intimate look at the civil-military transformation required to Westernize 
a nation.14 
David Yost tells another story of transition, one occurring in NATO after the 
demise of its main antagonist, the Soviet Union. In NATO Transformed, Yost describes in 
some detail the “origins, evolution, and prospects of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization’s new roles in international security.”15 These new roles can be broadly 
categorized as: cooperation with former adversaries and other non-NATO countries, and 
conducting crisis management and peace operations outside the territories of member 
nations. The chapter focusing on cooperation with former adversaries offers a roadmap of 
accession for Poland and other countries looking to join NATO, from joining the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council to participating in Partnership for Peace. Details of national 
debates among alliance members in regard to enlargement offer insight into the perceived 
dangers of NATO enlargement.16  
In European Foreign Policies: Does Europe Still Matter?, the question of 
European integration is explored through the lens of the European Union. Krzysztof 
                                                 
14 Jeffrey Simon, Poland and NATO: A Study in Civil-military Relations (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2004). 
15 Yost, NATO Transformed, 1. 
16 Ibid. 
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Bobinski focuses his chapter on Poland and Eastern Europe. This chapter covers not only 
EU expansion, but also the implications of NATO membership for Poland.17  
In Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, Jolyon Howorth provides 
a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP), known since December 2009 as CSDP. This book establishes how and why the 
EU decided to take serious steps toward becoming a security actor. It discusses in detail 
the processes and challenges the European Union went through in order to make this 
ambitious venture a reality. In addition, Howorth describes the key roles that states, 
including Poland, have played in making CSDP a credible international instrument. 
Specifically, the book recounts Poland’s journey into the EU and describes how Poland 
has established itself among European nations as a capable security provider.18 
Aside from theses and books, official national documents are able to provide an 
authoritative look at how governments plan to implement policy. A thesis on Poland’s 
integration in Western security structures would be incomplete without examining how 
Poland’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) have 
transformed since the country joined NATO and the EU. 
Poland published an NSS in 2003 and 2007. With the 2003 NSS coming four 
years after Poland joined NATO and the 2007 NSS issued three years after Poland 
entered the EU, these documents encapsulated major transition points in Poland’s 
national policies and international responsibilities. Poland’s 2003 NSS acknowledged the 
country’s increased role within its region and identified NATO and a bilateral agreement 
with the United States as the principal guarantees of its national security.19  The 2007 
                                                 
17 Krzysztof Bobinski, “Poland and Eastern Europe,” in European Foreign Policies: Does Europe 
Still Matter?, ed. Ronald Tiersky and John Van Oudenaren (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2010).  
18 Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defense Policy in the European Union, (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007). 
19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, National Security Strategy of the Republic of 
Poland, (Warsaw, 2003), 1, http://www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/livrobranco/arquivos/pdf/ 
Pol%c3%b4nia%202003.pdf. 
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NSS mentioned Poland as a key leader in support of CSDP and acknowledged concerns 
about a weakened United States position in Europe.20   
Poland published its NDS in 2000 and 2009. The nine-year time span between 
these two documents allows for an analysis of how Poland’s view of defense strategy 
changed. The 2000 NDS was published only one year after Poland joined NATO and one 
year before the jarring security implications of 9/11. In this relatively short document of 
23 pages, NATO is referred to 39 times.21  Poland’s 2009 NDS had a completely 
different perspective on security matters. The 2009 NDS mentioned the conflict in 
Georgia and stated that, although large scale war still seemed unlikely in Europe, the 
likelihood of an armed conflict near Poland’s border had increased, with Russia as the 
probable instigator.22 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will provide a historical study of Poland’s relationship with each 
specific security institution. Poland’s affiliation with NATO, the EU, and the Weimar 
Triangle will be examined separately. Major milestones in each relationship will be 
recounted. The effect of each institution on Polish policy will be determined, as well as 
any possible effects Poland may have had on the specific institution. 
The thesis will then synthesize the findings concerning each institutional 
relationship in order to draw conclusions about how Poland will probably continue to 
operate and integrate with each organization in the future. Each of these relationships is 
dynamic and, although interrelated with the other security institutions to a degree, comes 
with distinct benefits and challenges. As Poland balances its national priorities with its 
responsibility to each security institution, these relationships will constantly be redefined.  
                                                 
20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, National Security Strategy of the Republic of 
Poland, (Warsaw, 2007), 4, http://www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/livrobranco/arquivos/pdf/ 
Pol%c3%b4nia%202007.pdf. 
21 The Ministry of the National Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 
(Warsaw, 2000), 6, http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/ 
6086~v~The_National_Defense_Strategy_of_the_ Republic_of_Poland.pdf. 
22 The Ministry of the National Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 
(Warsaw, 2009), 7, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=156791. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis examines how and to what extent Poland has managed to integrate 
effectively in key Western security structures and become a competent ally with 
democratic ideals. In order to analyze Poland’s relationship with each Western security 
structure, a systematic approach is applied in order to investigate separately Poland’s role 
and influence within each institution.  
Chapter II is devoted to Poland’s role in NATO, including Warsaw’s interactions 
with the Allies during the years from the collapse of the Warsaw Pact (1991) to Poland’s 
membership in the Alliance (1999). This chapter also discusses how Poland’s role has 
evolved within the alliance from a new member to a competent contributor. An 
assessment of the future outlook for Poland within NATO concludes this portion of the 
thesis. 
Chapter III focuses on the long road to Poland’s membership in the EU in 2004. 
This chapter highlights the EU’s rather recent pursuit of a Common Security and Defense 
Policy, concentrating on Poland’s role within the CSDP and identifying specific military 
missions that Poland has been involved with. This section concludes with judgments 
about Poland’s probable involvement in future CSDP operations, as influenced by 
domestic politics and the EU’s desire to continue to develop CSDP as a credible tool. 
Chapter IV focuses on Poland’s participation in the Weimar Triangle. A brief 
history of the Weimar Triangle is reviewed in the first portion. Next, past and present 
goals of the Weimar Triangle are examined. Areas of cooperation within and beyond the 
Weimar Triangle are explored before concluding with an assessment of what roles the 
Weimar Triangle may play in the future.    
Chapter V summarizes the main findings of the thesis. 
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II. POLAND’S INTEGRATION INTO THE NORTH ATLANTIC 
TREATY ORGANIZATION 
In 1989, Poland was a member of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, 
and Mutual Assistance, more commonly known as the Warsaw Pact. In July 1991 this 
organization of communist states was officially dissolved, and in 1999 Poland was 
formally admitted into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). How did Poland, 
in a span of 10 years, manage to transition from being an adversary of the West to an 
influential member of an alliance committed to democracy and the maintenance of 
security across the territory of the alliance?  Poland’s conversion from a communist 
puppet state to a democratic leader in the region was not achieved without challenges and 
setbacks. One major step in this conversion was Poland’s accession into NATO.   
This chapter examines Poland’s role in NATO, including its journey from 
Warsaw Pact participant to Alliance member during the 1990s. In addition, this chapter 
analyzes Poland’s integration into NATO through its military reorganization and specific 
mission participation. Finally, an assessment of the future outlook for Poland within 
NATO is provided.  
A. POLAND’S ACCESSION INTO NATO  
Poland’s accession into NATO would not have been possible without the 
dissolution of NATO’s largest threat, the Warsaw Pact. The publicized intent of the 
communist security organization was to promote increased military cooperation among 
the member countries to ensure a secure Europe, but to the West, the Warsaw Pact 
remained shrouded in mystery throughout the entire Cold War.23  The Warsaw Pact was 
established in 1955, but came to a quiet end in 1991. The communist alliance lasted only 
36 years, but at its height, it was a formidable power capable of waging a devastating war 
throughout Europe.24  Ironically, the only military engagements the Warsaw Pact 
                                                 
23 Peter Gosztony, “Shield and Sword: Thoughts on the 20th Anniversary of the Founding of the 
Warsaw Pact,” Military Review 55, no. 12 (1975): 81. 
24 Robin Alison Remington, “The Warsaw Pact: Communist Coalition Politics in Action,” The 
Yearbook of World Affairs 27 (1973): 171–172. 
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undertook were against internal strife, and one of the biggest military alliances the world 
has seen disappeared without firing a single shot against the West. 
After the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, Poland’s accession into NATO was not 
a preordained event. Drastic changes in civil-military relations would be needed before 
Poland could be credibly considered for membership in the Alliance. In Poland and 
NATO: A Study in Civil-Military Relations, Jeffrey Simon states, “Between 1988 and 
1993 Poland’s democratic reform of the military was marked by governmental instability 
and constitutional and defense/legal ambiguities in the face of a self-confident military 
long accustomed to civilian incompetence.”25  It soon became clear that the euphoria of 
escaping communist oppression would give way to the reality of rebuilding a nation and 
rewiring the minds of its leaders. 
The key to modernizing Poland’s civil-military relations was to ensure democratic 
oversight of the military apparatus.26  According to Simon, there are four main factors 
used to measure the effectiveness of government oversight.27  First, the constitution 
should clearly demarcate a division of authority between the president and the 
government. This division must spell out who commands the military during wartime 
while still respecting the legitimacy and upholding the powers of the government. 
Second, the Parliament’s role of military oversight should extend to fiscal control of the 
defense budget. Third, a civilian defense ministry should manage strategic planning of all 
defense and personnel matters during peacetime. This should include an open flow of 
information to the public and the Parliament on how resources are being utilized. Finally, 
the government needs to actively work toward restoring military prestige, 
trustworthiness, and accountability. This would require a wide range of improvements 
from force modernization to an official code of conduct for soldiers.28 
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With these ideals in place as guidelines Poland proceeded to restructure its 
government and military according to a Western model, although the process was often 
complicated by lingering political habits left over from the communist era and political 
instability. From 1988 to 1993, Poland cycled through six prime ministers, five defense 
ministers, and two diametrically opposite presidents.29  The period from September 1993 
to December 1995 saw a more stable government with fewer political parties as a result 
of improved electoral laws.30  This period, however, was marred by a civil-military crisis 
at Drawsko. The event, in which the General Staff failed to support Defense Minister 
Piotr Kolodziejczyk and seemed willing to subordinate itself under the President Lech 
Walesa, highlighted failures within the constitution to properly delegate presidential and 
governmental authority.31  The election of 1995, which brought President Aleksander 
Kwasniewski to power, also ushered in significant headway toward more civil-military 
reform. Over the next two years, civilian oversight of the military continued to expand 
throughout the Defense Ministry and paved the way to formalizing the progressive 
changes in the 1997 constitution.32  After the ratification of the 1997 constitution the 
president and the government continued to test the limits of their powers, but civilian 
management and oversight of the Defense Ministry clearly improved.33  By the end of the 
20th century Poland’s military still required a major overhaul in everything from 
equipment to personnel standards, but the progressive changes in civil-military relations 
during the 1990s paved the way for these eventual improvements and showed the West 
that the government in Warsaw was serious about becoming a modern democratic state. 
The military advances would eventually come with NATO membership and active 
participation. 
As Poland’s civil-military relations came in line with Western standards it became 
possible for Poland to realistically envision a permanent partnership with NATO. 
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Poland’s first official step toward NATO membership occurred through participation in 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). In NATO Transformed, David Yost 
explains, “The NACC was composed of sixteen NATO countries and twenty-two other 
states, all ‘former adversaries.’  This new group encompassed all the members of the 
Warsaw Pact, including the successor states of the Soviet Union, and Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic.”34 The goal of the NACC was to move beyond routine communication 
between NATO nations and the former communist bloc.35  The NACC, as defined in the 
1991 Rome Declaration, was intended to build “a more institutional relationship of 
consultation and cooperation on political and security issues.”36  By limiting NACC 
membership to NATO and its former adversaries, it was hoped that the NACC would be 
instrumental in defusing tensions remaining from the Cold War.37   
Assemblies of the NACC were held fairly consistently, with foreign ministers 
meeting annually, ambassador level participation occurring every two months, and other 
consultations being held if the need arose.38  NACC activities initially consisted of 
workshops, seminars, and conferences, causing it to be branded by some observers as “a 
gigantic talking shop.”39  Over time, however, the agenda expanded to include complex 
and penetrating topics such as air defense, military procurement, economic planning, and 
disarmament technologies.40 
The main opponent of NACC formation and activity was France.41  France’s 
reservations toward the NACC stemmed from several factors.42  First, the French were 
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afraid that the NACC could somehow negatively impact the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the predecessor of today’s Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Second, the 1966 withdrawal of France from NATO’s 
integrated military structure meant that French defense ministers had not participated in 
NATO meetings for twenty-five years, and President François Mitterrand was not 
inclined to alter this practice. As a result, any NACC meetings with defense ministers 
were seen as informal.43 
It did not take long for NACC members to realize that, as groundbreaking as their 
organization was, its ability to act was limited in scope.44  The assembly was a great 
place to have all concerned parties listen to complaints, but the governments participating 
were hesitant to take any meaningful action. This eventually caused the topics of the 
sessions to encompass more realistic issues such as peacekeeping, scientific and 
environment cooperation, and arms control verification.45  In 1997 the NACC was 
replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.46 
During an informal meeting in October 1993, U.S. Secretary of Defense Les 
Aspin proposed a Partnership for Peace (PfP) program to other NATO defense ministers. 
PfP became a formal NATO program three months later in January 1994 and served as 
another key stepping stone for Poland’s eventual accession.47  In the North Atlantic 
Council declaration of 11 January 1994, the purpose behind PfP was explained as 
follows:  
At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the 
individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards 
transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of 
defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an 
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ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search 
and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.48  
The PfP program differs from the NACC in two unique ways.49 First, the PfP 
relationships are intended to be deeper and more structured than a country’s affiliation 
with the NACC. Second, and more importantly, the PfP is an individualized program 
between NATO and the partner state. This arrangement allows NATO—acting as the 
senior partner—to tailor specific activities, exercises, and exchanges with each partner. 
The result is a steady increase of operational capability tailored to a specific nation’s 
needs.50 
The Partnership for Peace program was initially criticized by some as a delay 
tactic used to postpone the question of NATO enlargement.51  The critics were soon 
silenced as PfP proved to be a worthwhile and versatile arrangement allowing some 
countries to use it as a platform to express serious desire for NATO membership while 
other nations simply used the PfP program to foster cooperation or as a learning 
experience.52  In 1998 Yost wrote, “PfP has rapidly become a pan-European security 
institution with greater military and political content than the OSCE.”53  The success of 
the PfP programs spans a range of activities such as exercises, exchanges, education, and 
training. Real world results of cooperation were seen during the Bosnian conflict under 
the Implementation Force (IFOR).54  The humanitarian crisis saw Partners providing 
military forces directly into a NATO command structure. This type of experience does 
more for increasing transparency and interoperability than any type of conference or 
workshop. For Poland, PfP proved to be a tool to expand regional cooperation. By 
participating in military exercises and operations with the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
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Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, and other countries, Poland has 
been able to use these shared experiences to bridge political difficulties with its 
neighbors.55 
As participation within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the PfP 
programs increased, the question of NATO enlargement could not be ignored for long. 
Although initially held at bay by most politicians in NATO nations in the early 1990s, by 
the end of 1993 the question of NATO enlargement required answering and became an 
issue of debate within the Alliance.56  As the U.S. political administration transitioned in 
1993, with President Clinton taking office, a strong interest in NATO enlargement arose 
from the other side of the Atlantic.57  By 1994, the prospect of U.S. leadership on the 
subject of enlargement signaled to the rest of the Alliance that the issue was worthy of 
serious debate.58 
As can be expected from a multinational organization requiring consensus, the 
deliberations on the topic were thorough. In Yost’s words, “NATO subsequently decided 
to study the questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ before tackling the questions of ‘who’ and 
‘when.’”59  The first concrete steps were taken in December 1994, when the North 
Atlantic Council decided to initiate a study of the process of how NATO could be 
enlarged. The results of this inquiry were expressed in a document released by NATO in 
September 1995 entitled Study on NATO Enlargement.60  The study listed seven 
rationales for NATO enlargement which can be summarized as follows: to encourage and 
support democratic reform; to foster cooperation, consultation, and consensus building 
among new members; to promote good neighbor relations; to emphasize common 
defence; to reinforce integration while curbing disintegration along ethnic and territorial 
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lines; to strengthen NATO’s ability to contribute to European and international security; 
and to strengthen the Trans-Atlantic partnership.61 
With these guidelines in place, the questions of “who” and “when” took center 
stage. NATO’s first enlargement since the end of the Cold War would be offered to the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The invitation was formalized during the 1997 
NATO summit in Madrid. With strong political support from the United States, the goal 
was to have the new members officially inducted by the fiftieth anniversary of the North 
Atlantic Treaty in April 1999.62 
Evan as the political will for enlargement was consolidated throughout the 
Alliance, the degree of support or reservation on the subject within each NATO nation 
varied. The U.S. Senate voted 80–19 in favor of expansion, although plenty of internal 
debate expressed the serious concerns of some politicians who feared that a move toward 
NATO enlargement would dampen Russian relations.63  In Germany, the arguments for 
NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe included a desire to stabilize the 
country’s eastern border and, as Yost remarked, “the sense of moral and political 
responsibility for the fate of these countries.”64  The debate on enlargement garnered 
little attention in the French public sphere, but was hotly contested among officials.65  Up 
until May 1995, with the election of French President Jacques Chirac, France openly 
expressed reservations toward NATO expansion and, at a minimum, sought to delay the 
process.66  By 1997, however, France not only supported bringing the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland into the Alliance, but fought to extend the invitation to Romania.67 
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The reluctance toward NATO enlargement was not only an internal issue among 
NATO member states; it also derived from legitimate strategic concerns. According to 
Yost: 
 Interviews with well-informed observers in several NATO nations 
suggest that four reservations about NATO enlargement are particularly 
salient: its potential impact on Alliance cohesion; the implications for the 
“also-rans,” the unsuccessful applicants in the first wave of post-Cold War 
enlargement; the risk of an unnecessary confrontation with Russia; and the 
gravity of accepting new collective defense obligations.68 
The first concern, Alliance cohesion, was expressed by critics who believed that 
NATO decision making is already burdensome enough. By admitting three new members 
from such a volatile region, the opponents of expansion argued, NATO would turn its 
deliberations into stalemates.69 
The second reservation highlighted an important question, what to do with the 
“also-rans.”  In other words, how could NATO assuage the fears of the nations not 
accepted during the first round of enlargement and assure those same nations that 
NATO’s door remains open?  The Allies agreed that, as Yost put it, “NATO enlargement 
must be an ‘inclusive’ process of indefinite scope and duration. It appears that an open-
ended process is seen as the necessary complement to taking in only a few new Allies.”70 
The third factor recognizes a genuine security threat, antagonizing Russia.71  A 
clear contradiction exists between NATO’s assertion that enlargement is not meant as a 
reaction to a Russian threat and the reality that most Central and Eastern European states 
are pursuing NATO membership to prevent future Russian aggression. To this day, when 
entertaining the thought of further enlargement, NATO must walk a fine line between 
functioning as an independent security organization and respecting Russian interests and 
sensitivities.72 
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The fourth issue tackles a broader question, will NATO be able to accept and 
honor its new collective defense obligations?73  Critics of enlargement point out that the 
reasons for expanding NATO seem to refer to collective security rather than collective 
defense. In their eyes, criteria for NATO admission should be based on a nation’s 
tangible contribution to territorial defense, not its implementation of democratic 
principles or successful civil-military reform. Some proponents of enlargement do not see 
collective defense as an Alliance priority because they do not view Russia as a credible 
threat in the short term. NATO remains confident that it can fulfil its Article 5 
guarantee.74 
B. POLAND’S ROLE IN NATO 
Since Poland’s accession into NATO on 12 March 1999 the country has grown 
into a willing and capable Alliance member. How has Poland effectively integrated into 
NATO and become one of the organization’s most active participants?  This 
transformation will be considered in detail from two vantage points. First, an analysis of 
Poland’s military reorganization and defense strategy evolution will be conducted. This 
will be accomplished by a brief review of the following documents: the 2000 National 
Defense Strategy (NDS) of the Republic of Poland, the 2003 National Security Strategy 
(NSS) of the Republic of Poland, Poland’s 2007 National Security Strategy, and the 2009 
National Defense Strategy. The review will highlight the changes required to modernize 
Poland’s military forces. Second, Poland’s role within NATO will be explored through its 
involvement in NATO operations and its contribution to specific missions. While still a 
PfP country, Poland participated in IFOR and SFOR, the crisis management operation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in support of the Dayton Accords. Poland went on to contribute 
to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan, as well as other smaller operations. Poland’s maturity as an Alliance 
member can be calibrated in the ever increasing value of its contributions to these various 
missions. Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya, on the other hand, provided an 
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example of Poland’s domestic politics and assessment of national strategic priorities 
limiting support for a NATO operation. 
According to the Ministry of Defence 2001 White Paper, by officially joining 
NATO, Poland “acquired a full and credible guarantee of security and the possibility to 
participate in collective defense.”75  Although this was a momentous event for Poland’s 
national security, it came with an obligation to update the NSS and NDS in order to meet 
looming NATO responsibilities. The importance of the Alliance membership was 
immediately seen in Poland’s 2000 National Defense Strategy. NATO was referred to 
thirty-nine times in the twenty-three page document. Section 3 of the NDS states, “The 
national defense strategy of the Republic of Poland, whilst considering the national 
interests and conditions, is also correlated to NATO’s strategy.”76  An early commitment 
to NATO’s strategic vision emerged in the NDS when Poland acknowledged that “The 
risk of large scale war has decreased significantly.”77  This type of statement stands in 
sharp contrast to Poland’s threat perception during the Cold War and recognizes the role 
of NATO as a peace provider. 
Poland’s 2003 National Security Strategy continued the themes from the 2000 
NDS, but also took into account the jarring security implications of 9/11. The 2003 NSS 
even stated that international terrorism was the most serious threat currently facing 
Poland and identified NATO, along with a bilateral agreement with the United States, as 
the principal guarantees of its national security.78  By 2003, Poland looked to play an 
increased security role within its region. The NSS declared, “Poland shall develop 
bilateral cooperation with its neighbors and also other countries in the region for the 
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benefit of all-around stabilization of the security situation in this part of Europe.”79  In an 
article in Contemporary Security Policy, Laura Chappell of the University of Surrey 
observed that, due to the history of invasions in the region, it was paramount for Poland 
to keep Eastern Europe from becoming a “buffer zone or security grey area.”80 
During the first five years of NATO membership Poland underwent a grand 
transition, delineating itself as a Central European nation with a commitment toward the 
West and casting off any remaining links to its communist past. Poland retained certain 
aspects of its defense identity during this period, but by embracing its role within NATO, 
Poland redefined its traditional views on national defense. 
Recently Poland has grown into the role of a vocal country, integrated within 
NATO as a key nation with credible military forces. The 2007 NSS reaffirmed Poland’s 
commitment toward modernizing its military forces and advanced the state’s national 
security agenda. The document confirmed NATO as a fundamental element of national 
security and acknowledged that Poland saw itself as a regional leader in security affairs.81  
The 2007 NSS also expressed a mature and objective outlook toward the global security 
environment, conceding the weakened position of the United States due to the unpopular 
invasion of Iraq and the difficult operations in Afghanistan.82  This was followed by a 
call for improved transatlantic relations and a “rapprochement of the views of allies on 
the most important international security issues.”83  The 2007 NSS also proved to be 
prescient in its traditional cautious perception of Russia. The document predicted, “The 
Russian Federation, taking advantage of the rising energy prices, has been attempting 
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intensively to reinforce its position on a superregional level.”84  In light of the 2008 
Russo-Georgian war and the 2014 developments in Ukraine, it seems that Poland was 
correct in its assessment. 
The security priorities and concerns that were identified in the 2007 NSS had a 
direct impact on the National Defense Strategy published by Poland in 2009. The 2009 
NDS placed an emphasis on increased regional cooperation. Lessons from Afghanistan 
are echoed throughout the document, which asserted that, while the period of armed 
aggression during a conflict has been reduced, the post-conflict stage tends to be drawn 
out. The 2009 NDS also reiterated that asymmetrical threats were a prominent security 
risk and that the most serious danger continued to come from international terrorism.85 
The documents reviewed above were instrumental in making the changes required 
to transform Poland into a reliable ally. The credibility of its military forces, however, 
could only be proven through participation in NATO operations. Poland found no 
shortage of opportunities to embed itself within the NATO military structure and take 
part in joint and combined campaigns. From its modest contributions during the 1995 
Bosnian crisis to its robust effort throughout Afghanistan, Poland’s increased role within 
the Alliance has been noticeable. 
Poland’s first NATO mission happened to be NATO’s first peacekeeping 
operation. Not an Alliance member yet, but an active participant in Partnership for Peace, 
Poland joined the Implementation Force (IFOR) in an effort code-named Operation Joint 
Endeavor (1995-1996) to enforce the Dayton peace agreement and put an end to the 
fighting in Bosnia. In the subsequent Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations Joint Guard 
(1996-1998) and Joint Forge (1998-2004) Poland worked alongside NATO member 
states and other PfP partners to uphold the peace process.86 
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After the 1999 NATO air campaign in Kosovo, a UN Security Council-approved 
military operation known as Joint Guardian was established to keep the peace in the area. 
The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), composed of 50,000 soldiers from 30 nations, 
acted to prevent a humanitarian crisis.87  Poland sent a battalion of troops to join 
International Task Force East.88  Currently, Poland maintains 200 troops as part of 
KFOR. They are responsible for fighting organized crime while supporting local 
authorities and maintaining security.89  
The two aforementioned operations were instrumental in easing Poland into the 
coalition environment and helped prepare the military for its herculean effort with the 
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The mission of ISAF, according 
to a NATO webpage, is to “create the conditions whereby the Government of 
Afghanistan is able to exercise its authority throughout the country.”90  As of 1 June 
2014, Poland is contributing 968 troops to the ISAF mission.91  Poland engaged in ISAF 
early on, sending 100 troops and support personnel into Afghanistan in March 2002.92  
As Polish forces continued to prove themselves on the battlefield, Poland’s contributions 
and responsibilities in the war effort increased. By 2010 Poland was responsible for the 
security of the Ghazni province and had over 2,600 personnel in Afghanistan.93  The 
experience gained during such a long term engagement is invaluable. Due to the number 
of troops rotating through Afghanistan since 2002, key elements of the Polish armed 
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forces have credible battlefield experience and a practical understanding of the coalition 
environment.94  In addition, the Polish government used the involvement in ISAF to 
prioritize needed military modernization and as an opportunity to build Allied 
solidarity.95 
Poland’s noted absence from participation in Operation Unified Protector, the 
2011 UN Security Council-approved NATO intervention in Libya, stands in sharp 
contrast to the nation’s historical support for Allied operations. NATO’s involvement in 
the Libyan conflict indicated that all twenty-eight nations of the Alliance supported the 
operation politically, including the use of the Alliances infrastructure. Poland was not the 
only state that abstained from direct participation with air or naval forces. When the 
mission concluded in October 2011, only half of the NATO countries provided any air or 
sea power during the campaign while a mere eight of the contributing nations conducted 
strike operations.96 
Some have taken an optimistic view on OUP, stressing that the operation 
introduced a new model of burden sharing for NATO, one in which the United States 
could play a supporting role while other Alliance members take the lead.97  Robert Gates, 
then Secretary of Defense, took the lack of member participation in Libya as a warning. 
Gates said that many NATO members failed to contribute to OUP not because they chose 
not to, but because they did not have the capability to wage a modern air campaign.98  
Equally frustrating, according to Gates, were Allies that had the capabilities, but chose 
not to participate—notably Germany and Poland.99 
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For Poland, the choice of not participating in OUP may have been a result of 
domestic pressure and strategic judgment. Daria Dylla of the University of Cologne has 
listed four reasons why Poland may have chosen to refrain from direct action in Libya.100  
First, Libya has no strategic value for Poland. Second, when the conflict began Poland 
was preparing to take over the rotating EU presidency. By not actively engaging in OUP, 
Poland maintained a neutral position that would allow it to possibly mediate the conflict 
between the EU and the Arab world. Third, Poland’s military was stretched thin and 
over-exerted after a decade of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fourth, domestic opinion 
weighed heavily in Warsaw. Surveys showed that most Poles believed that intervention 
in Libya was justified, but 88 percent of respondents opposed deploying Polish military 
forces in the region. Whether Poland’s decision to not participate in Operation Unified 
Protector will affect its credibility within the Alliance remains to be seen.101 
C. FUTURE OUTLOOK FOR POLAND IN NATO 
Poland has learned valuable lessons since joining NATO. It has seen its national 
defense strategy complete the transition from a Cold War relic to a modern Western 
policy in support of the Alliance’s strategic objectives. As Poland continues to apply the 
lessons learned and experiences gained over this period, future Polish National Security 
Strategies and National Defense Strategies will outline the direction in which the country 
is headed. Recent political developments on the continent will certainly factor into 
Poland’s defense strategy as it, once again, feels the vulnerability of being a NATO 
border state. 
One particularly interesting development has been Poland’s recent increase in 
defense spending—specifically toward territorial defense capabilities—as the majority of 
NATO members have been shrinking their defense budgets.102  This increase in defense 
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spending is directly tied to the success and growth of Poland’s economy, currently ranked 
ninth among EU states, and the legal requirement to allocate 1.95% of its GDP on the 
military. This has led to the launch of the most ambitious armed forces modernization 
plan Poland has ever seen, with Minister of Defense Thomas Siemoniak promising the 
equivalent of $30 billion dollars toward the effort through 2022. With this amount of 
development occurring in a relatively short period of time, the capacity of Poland’s 
acquisition process to handle the new requirements will be tested.103 
This sudden commitment to increased investments in territorial defense and 
national capabilities is absolutely warranted, according to Marek Swierczynski, a Polish 
journalist: 
The gas-wars with Ukraine and Belarus, the invasion of Georgia, the air-
raids over the Baltic Sea, and Russia’s withdrawal from the CFE treaty, 
which leaves the Kaliningrad-zone beyond control – all that wasn’t, in 
Poland’s view, countered by proper NATO response and has thus left 
Poland in doubt and focused on itself.104 
Although Poland’s security will critically depend on NATO, it seems that the 
government is returning toward a more traditional view of national security. Poland’s 
2009 NDS offered hints of a shift in strategic thinking, and the recent events in Ukraine 
prove that the move toward regional partnerships and an emphasis on territorial defense 
were warranted. 
Poland’s experience in the Middle East over the last decade has proved to be 
transformative, both for its military and its European credibility. As Poland adjusts to a 
local defensive posture, the lessons learned from combat and the capabilities gained from 
operating in a joint and combined environment will remain as positive influences within 
the armed forces for several years. Whether NATO will continue to pursue a global 
presence or will be forced to retract into Europe due to fiscal and political limitations 
remains to be seen. Poland, however, will concentrate its effort on homeland defense and 
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increased regional cooperation. This course will not be pursued to undermine NATO, but 
rather to strengthen the alliance as a whole.105 
Within the Poland-NATO relationship, Poland is not the only party to have 
matured since 1991. NATO has itself been transformed by world events such as the 9/11 
attacks, recent fiscal constraints, and current Russian aggression in Ukraine. These events 
have caused all the Allies to reevaluate their strategic position and priorities, but the 
Alliance must maintain a shared vision to be effective. NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept 
identified three core tasks: Collective Defense, Crisis Management, and Cooperative 
Security.106  It is on the implementation of these tasks that NATO’s future cohesion and 
success hinge. Yost summarizes the struggle as follows: 
The risk of the Alliance’s overextension has become obvious. The fatigue 
with Afghanistan has become palpable, the budget crunch has constrained 
resources for operations and force modernization, and the consensus on 
how to address longstanding challenges (such as relations with Russia) 
and emerging issues (such as energy security) has become fragile.107 
It would be wrong to differentiate between the future security concerns of Poland 
and those of NATO as a whole. Clear delineations between a threat to Poland, Central 
and Eastern Europe, and the entire Alliance cannot be made, and those who try to make 
such distinctions risk not only alienating key Allies, but also placing the whole 
organization in jeopardy. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Poland has completed its journey from Warsaw Pact adversary to influential 
NATO member. Through civil-military restructuring and economic reform, Poland has 
earned a prominent seat at the table of the most significant collective defense 
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organization in the world. By gradually playing an increased role in NATO operations, 
Poland has modernized its armed forces and established credibility with its Allies and 
other nations. As the security environment around the world continues to change, Poland 
will find itself on a new journey, this time helping to lead NATO through future 
challenges. The Alliance will require bold leadership to reassure the existing Allies of 
NATO’s commitment to collective defense while, at the same time, shaping a strategy to 
expand the influence of democracy and security. 
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III. POLAND’S INTEGRATION INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AND PARTICIPATION IN THE EU’S COMMON SECURITY AND 
DEFENSE POLICY 
The European Union is an ongoing and developing project that traces its origins 
back from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1951. Although originally 
envisioned as an economic and political entity, the European Union’s impact on stability 
within and among its member states proves that the organization plays at least an indirect 
role in ensuring security throughout the region.108 In this light the EU has been an 
attractive beacon for Poland, even throughout the Cold War. During communist rule and 
in the years immediately following, the EU’s emphasis on economic development offered 
Poland a less controversial avenue to cooperate with the West.109  According to Marcin 
Zaborowski, director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, “In Poland, an 
overwhelming sense of ‘belonging to Europe’ prevailed among the population throughout 
the postwar period.”110  Poland quickly viewed the EU as a vital key to rejoining Europe 
and minimizing dependence on Russia. 
By the late 1990s the European Union’s role evolved into an institution with real 
ambitions in the fields of security and defense, currently known as the Common Security 
and Defense Policy (CSDP). Poland, initially pursuing EU membership as “a secure 
economic and political anchor for the post-1989 changes,” according to Krzystof 
Bobinski, now found itself potentially under the umbrella of—and participating in—
another security institution.111  How would Poland react to this new EU mission?  Would 
Poland view CSDP as another opportunity to further integrate into Western institutions, 
while at the same time using this new EU interest in security and defense to bolster its 
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own military capability?  This chapter examines Poland’s role in the European Union, 
with particular attention to Poland’s increased involvement in the Common Security and 
Defense Policy arena. The chapter begins with a brief history of the EU and the major 
developments leading to the creation of CSDP. This chapter then focuses on Poland’s 
road to accession, highlighting the political hurdles the nation had to overcome prior to 
becoming an EU member state. The chapter also gives specific attention to Poland’s role 
in CSDP and particular missions to which Poland has contributed. Finally, an assessment 
of the future outlook for Poland and the EU is provided. 
A. POLAND’S ACCESSION INTO THE EU 
According to the 1957 Treaty of Rome, all countries within Europe are eligible to 
join the EU. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Poland was eager to secure a lifeline 
around any institution that would prevent the nation from slipping eastward, both 
economically and politically.112  In order to understand Poland’s desire to become a 
member of the EU, one must briefly recount the history and major milestones of this 
evolving European organization. 
The beginning of the EU can be traced back to 1951 with the establishment of the 
ECSC.113  The idea for such a community stemmed from the Schuman declaration, 
referring to then French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, and his vision of a new form 
of political cooperation throughout Europe. Some of the goals of this economic union 
also had clear political implications—for example, to protect against future German 
aggression by controlling collectively the resources required to wage war: coal and steel. 
The ECSC was comprised of France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and 
West Germany. The establishment of the ECSC as a supranational organization 
demonstrated the willingness of these countries to forgo certain aspects of national 
sovereignty in order to maintain peace.114  
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In 1950–1954, France also championed the creation of a supranational European 
Defense Community (EDC); however, this proposal ultimately failed.115  As it turns out, 
the European nations (including France) were not ready to relinquish national control 
over security and defense matters. The failure of the EDC proposal led to the 
establishment of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1954. The WEU was based on a 
modified version of the Treaty of Brussels signed in 1948 and acted as an 
intergovernmental security organization for the six countries within the ECSC, plus Great 
Britain. Due to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, the 
WEU had little strategic impact for the first 30 years of its existence, but it did manage to 
act as a sounding board for European countries on foreign policy issues and was free 
from the influence of the United States.116 
In 1957, the Treaty of Rome was signed by the same six countries that formed the 
ECSC, establishing the European Economic Communities (EEC) and European Atomic 
Energy Community (EURATOM). These three organizations would be joined together 
by the Merger Treaty of 1967 and officially come to be known as the European 
Communities (EC).117 
The 1970s and 1980s showed little development along the common security and 
defense front for Europe. There were political changes, however, taking place throughout 
the continent; and with the Cold War coming to an end, Europe’s Trans-Atlantic 
relationship would need to be redefined. Among the many consequences of the Soviet 
Union’s collapse, Jolyon Howorth tells us, was the “lessening strategic importance of 
Europe for the USA.”118  The fear of a diverging relationship between the United States 
and Europe led to the revitalization of the WEU and a renewed urgency to find a 
coordinated position on foreign policy.119 
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The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992 by 12 member states, officially changed 
the name of the European Communities to the European Union and instituted a three 
pillar system comprised of European Community, Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), and Justice and Home Affairs. As the second pillar, the objective of CFSP was to 
establish the EU on the international foreign policy scene.120  The decade of the 1990s 
proved that the development of CFSP within the EU was a necessary step, but it would 
also highlight limitations. For example, the fact that the EU could not successfully 
resolve the Balkan conflict without outside assistance pinpointed a key security 
problem.121 
Also in 1992, the WEU, although still separate from the EU at this time, adopted 
the Petersberg tasks. Section II Paragraph 4 of the Petersberg Declaration states: 
Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels 
Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member States, acting under 
the authority of WEU, could be employed for: 
 humanitarian and rescue tasks; 
 peacekeeping tasks; 
 tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking122 
Lessons learned from the early 1990s led to the EU’s 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam 
which, among other things, introduced considerable changes in the field of CFSP, 
including the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the new treaty.123  Possibly the 
most important advancement for CFSP was the creation of a new position, High 
Representative for EU Foreign Policy. This position provided the outside world with a 
name and face responsible for EU foreign policy.124 
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Directly on the heels of the Amsterdam Treaty came a historic Anglo-French 
summit in St. Malo in December 1998. At this summit, Great Britain changed its position 
on European security and defense policies. The British contended that a strong Europe, 
with the ability to act autonomously, would, rather than threaten NATO, actually 
strengthen Trans-Atlantic relations. In the words of the St. Malo Declaration, “the 
[European] Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible 
military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to 
respond to international crises.”125  The declaration by Great Britain and France sparked 
a renewed emphasis on security institution building within the EU.126 
The summit also resulted in the Helsinki Headline Goals. This initiative was 
adopted by the European Council a year after the St. Malo declaration and laid out a 
military capability target, requiring the EU to deploy and sustain a corps-size unit able to 
conduct military operations in support of the Petersberg tasks.127  The achievement of the 
St. Malo declaration and the Helsinki Headline Goals were reaffirmed in the Treaty of 
Nice in 2003. While the Treaty of Nice allowed for the eastern expansion of the EU, 
which Poland had long been waiting for, it also managed to solidify some of the progress 
in CFSP. Notably, the Treaty of Nice authorized the EU to take responsibility for 
particular tasks once accomplished by the WEU.128 
The Lisbon Treaty, also known as the Reform Treaty, was signed in 2007 and 
entered into force in 2009. This treaty also had broad implications throughout the EU, 
dissolving the three pillar structure, updating the role of the High Representative, and 
formalizing the term CSDP. 
The history of the European Union shows that the seeds of collaborative European 
security and defense have potential to grow. The accession of Poland and other former 
Soviet satellites in 2004 not only added drama to these events, but also magnified the 
implications of a new regional security institution. 
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Poland’s decision to pursue EU membership was as much a return to its cultural 
roots as it was a longing for improved economic conditions and democratic policies. 
Poland’s ties to a European identity reach back to the year 966 when Prince Mieszko, 
regarded as Poland’s first ruler, decided to be baptized in Rome, sealing a bond with 
Western Christendom.129 Poland’s long history of Western tradition, however, did not 
guarantee a smooth transition into the EU. According to Zaborowski, “Poland proved to 
be the most difficult of the accession countries.”130 
 The EU, being an economic and political organization, was in a prime position to 
quickly react to the changing political landscape of 1989. Evidence of this can be seen in 
the speedy establishment of Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their 
Economies, an economic recovery program known as PHARE. This program, originally 
established to support Poland and Hungary through their post-communist transitions, 
would eventually develop into the EU’s financial instrument to help all countries seeking 
EU membership.131 
Poland’s first milestone toward integrating with the EU occurred in December 
1991 with the signing of the European Agreements. While not actually addressing the 
issue of enlargement, these agreements did create an official association between the EU 
and Poland. According to an EU press release, the agreements “set out the framework for 
political dialogue and the promotion of the expansion of trade and economic relations 
with a view to contributing   to the economic development and prosperity of the 
signatories.”132 
These early programs and agreements set the stage for the EU member states to 
reach a consensus on enlargement. The eastern expansion of the EU became official 
policy during the 1993 Copenhagen summit. At this summit, the EU states agreed on 
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specific guidelines, known as the Copenhagen criteria, for future EU membership. An 
invitation was extended to all the countries that already had European Agreements 
established with the EU. John Van Oudenaren summarizes the Copenhagen criteria as 
“economic viability and the establishment of democratic institutions and free market 
economic systems.”133  The attainment of these terms would become a major priority for 
Poland over the next ten years.134 
While the Copenhagen summit proved that the EU had the political will to make 
enlargement a reality, “it was clear,” according to Zaborowski, “that the accession 
countries would struggle to meet all the legal and technical requirements that needed to 
be adopted prior to the opening of actual negotiations.”135  As a result, by 1994 the EU 
began to establish a structural relationship with the prospective new members. This 
arrangement allowed the Central and Eastern European nations to join in a limited 
number of internal EU meetings and provided access to legal and technical assistance 
programs for the candidate countries.136 
By 1998 Poland had sufficiently met the Copenhagen criteria and was invited to 
begin official membership negotiations. This marked a transition for Poland in its course 
to join the EU. What was originally a matter of political courtship now became a more 
technocratic process that would prove extremely difficult to conclude for Poland, the 
largest and strategically most significant nation among the accession states.137 
The negotiations required Poland to find a common position among the member 
states on 31 different topics. According to the EU website: 
The negotiations determine the conditions under which each applicant 
country will join the European Union. On joining the Union, applicants 
are expected to accept the “acquis,” i.e., the detailed laws and rules 
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adopted on the basis of the EU’s founding treaties, mainly the treaties of 
Rome, Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice. The negotiations focus on the 
terms under which the applicants will adopt, implement and enforce the 
acquis, and, notably, the granting of possible transitional arrangements 
which must be limited in scope and duration. Under similar arrangements 
in previous accession negotiations, new Member States have been able to 
phase in their compliance with certain laws and rules by a date agreed 
during the negotiations.138 
The negotiation process required the direct involvement of all major ministries 
within the Polish government. In Zaborowski’s words, “Overall, negotiations led to a 
greater engagement of more domestic actors attempting to influence national positions 
and defend their particular interests in the process.”139  The result was a domestication of 
the negotiations which brought to light politically charged questions about many of the 
31 topics up for negotiation. Foremost among the problems were issues concerning 
migrant workers and agricultural subsidies.140  
The years between 1998 and 2004 proved to be a challenging period for Poland 
and the EU. As Polish domestic politics continued to mature and the EU acknowledged 
that enlargement without Poland was unreasonable, the two entities found enough 
common ground to formalize their relationship and complete Poland’s latest quest for 
Europeanization. On 16 April 2003 the Accession Treaty was signed by EU member 
states and representatives of the ten new European Union members, Poland among them. 
The treaty came into effect on 1 May 2004, marking the official date when Poland 
became an EU member. 
B. POLAND’S ROLE IN CSDP 
Poland’s road to European Union membership was longer than most Poles had 
hoped and was fraught with substantial political potholes. This turbulent journey is also 
mirrored in Poland’s participation in the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy. 
This section explains how Poland’s role within CSDP has evolved, emphasizing Poland’s 
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transition from a staunch NATO Atlanticist country to a nation with a more balanced 
view of CSDP pragmatism. This section will also examine in some detail Poland’s role in 
CSDP missions, showing Poland’s increased involvement in the EU as a security 
institution. 
After the events of World War II, from September 1939 to the end, including 
Poland’s feeling of being deserted and betrayed at Yalta, it is no wonder that the primary 
focus of Poland’s strategic culture is maintaining Polish independence. This explains why 
the country is skeptical of the capacity of weak multilateral institutions to provide 
security.141  As a result, Poland’s security strategy initially favored—and continues to 
call for—a strong U.S. bilateral relationship and the decisive support of NATO. Poland 
gained NATO membership in 1999, five years before its EU membership, and Warsaw 
would be reluctant to do anything to undermine NATO’s promise of collective defense. 
Olaf Osica, a political analyst from the Natolin European Center, writes, “Polish 
politicians believed that the best place to develop European capabilities in defence policy 
was within NATO.”142 
Poland’s preference for credible U.S. security guarantees over any kind of newly 
formed EU security policy is not surprising. In explaining Poland’s decision to participate 
in the United States-led coalition in the 2003 Iraq War, Bobinski wrote, “In a nutshell, a 
country like Poland went into Iraq because it felt that by fighting in Baghdad, it was 
taking out an insurance policy for any future threat to Bialystok on its eastern border.”143  
By the time Poland officially joined the EU in 2004 this Atlanticist attitude prejudiced its 
support for CSDP. Poland was not willing to jeopardize its U.S. and NATO pledges for 
an unproven EU security initiative. 
Recently, Poland’s mindset has shifted toward a more balanced approach to 
CSDP. Howorth holds that this is a “consequence of two major developments: growing 
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disillusionment with the U.S. record in Iraq; and the consequences of Polish membership 
in the EU.”144  Zaborowski supports this first point by stating, “The Iraq crisis was the 
first case when Poland experienced the perils of American leadership and hegemony.”145  
In a 2004 press conference, Polish President Kwasniewski voiced his disapproval 
regarding the chief rationale for the US-led intervention when he declared that “Poland 
was misled” by the United States concerning the issue of Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction.146 
Howorth’s second judgment—that Poland’s growing acceptance of CSDP is due 
to Poland’s increasingly involved membership within the EU—also has merit. Howorth 
points out that there has “been a growing sense that Warsaw can play a genuinely leading 
role among major European decision-makers.”147  There is a candid belief that Poland 
can be more influential in the EU than in NATO. Chappell explains, “For the Poles, the 
importance of being able to participate in decisions affecting their interests in security 
matters means that Polish policy-makers are looking to play a key role in CSDP.”148  
Howorth also asserts that “Warsaw’s desired policy of extending the security hand of 
friendship to its Eastern neighbors will be more easily—and probably more 
successfully—implemented via ESDP than via NATO.”149  Poland’s current view on 
security institutions has clearly evolved into a pragmatic belief that benefits can be 
derived from a strong NATO policy and a realistic CSDP capability, plus a close 
relationship with the United States. In April 2008, Bogdan Klich, then the defense 
minister of Poland, said, “It is necessary to host on our territory institutions either from 
the alliance, the EU or the United States. These are the three pillars of our security.”150 
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What evidence is there that Poland’s balanced security strategy has been 
institutionalized throughout its Defense Ministry?  For one thing, Poland’s latest National 
Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy articulate the change. The 2007 NSS 
lists the EU as one of the organizations fundamental to Poland’s national security.151  The 
2009 NDS specifically mentions that Poland’s security is enhanced by the EU and that 
the European Union is one of Poland’s main reference points in foreign and defense 
policy.152 
More conclusive evidence of Poland’s new found acceptance of CSDP can be 
seen in the specific EU missions that the country has contributed to and supported. 
Poland’s first EU operation was CONCORDIA, conducted in Macedonia. The task lasted 
from 31 March 2003 to 15 December 2003 with the goal of stabilizing the area in order to 
allow for a peaceful and democratic country to emerge.153 
Since then Poland has participated in six unique EU missions. These operations 
were not limited to Europe. Polish troops have been deployed as far south as the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and as far east as Georgia. The types of missions have 
also varied. In Macedonia, Poland participated in military operations and police missions. 
In Georgia, the Polish troops were sent in support of a rule of law mission.154 
Currently, Poland is engaged in 15 ongoing EU missions spanning a large area of 
the globe and fulfilling specialized needs.155  The involvement of the European Union’s 
CSDP in such missions marks a new development for the EU. For Poland, CSDP 
provides another option in the realm of security and defense. Rather than viewing NATO 
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and CSDP as two separate “all or nothing” choices, Warsaw recognizes that increased 
options allow for flexibility of response. 
C. FUTURE OUTLOOK FOR POLAND IN THE EU 
Poland has slowly embraced the European Union as a legitimate security 
institution capable of certain tasks under the aegis of the CSDP. This does not mean, 
however, that the road ahead for Poland and the EU is free of obstacles. The idea of 
CSDP playing a larger role within the EU is not universally accepted among the EU 
members. This section reviews the limitations CSDP faces within the EU before focusing 
on some of the perceived advantages of this new security and defense policy. This section 
concludes with an outlook on Poland’s future role within CSDP. 
The two ominous limitations to an effective CSDP in the near future are the 
differences of national strategic culture found among the 28 EU member states and the 
fiscal constraints on supporting yet another security institution. If it is assumed that the 
European Union will need to corral 28 national strategic cultures into a single vision in 
order to provide an effective security and defense policy, then CSDP may have a 
frustrating future. According to Geoffrey Edwards, “National discourses retain a 
legitimacy that European multilateralism has difficulty in challenging.”156  Each unique 
national strategic culture now becomes an independent variable that has the potential to 
drastically change in relation to external influences and that will for the foreseeable 
future carry more relevance than the common goal of a multinational union. Expansion of 
the EU will only complicate this situation.157  This was evident when the newly admitted 
Central and Eastern European states brought their own foreign policy priorities to the 
table. With a focus on territorial defense and a high level of concern about Russian 
policies, countries such as Poland and the Baltic states are skeptical of CSDP capabilities 
and tend to trust bilateral agreements with the United States over the burgeoning, but 
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limited EU security apparatus.158  Christoph Meyer explains, “We cannot assume that 
transnational homogeneity is the natural state of affairs in a European Union consisting of 
member states with sometimes long and diverse historical experiences.”159 
National budgets pose a second, similarly obstructive, limitation to the future of 
CSDP authority. For the EU to have a recognized and respected foreign policy program, 
with a credible defense arm, the rhetoric will need to be supported by financial 
commitments from each country. Currently there is a disconnect between the EU’s 
ambition to support the Helsinki Headline Goals and the reduced defense expenditures 
throughout most of its member states.160  The military budgets of countries within the EU 
range from 43 billion euros for Great Britain to 44 million euros for Malta.161  This 
disparity highlights the differences in resources of the EU states, but it may also speak to 
a difference in priorities when it comes to defense expenditures. If the budgets across 
Europe diminish, so too may the scope and relevance of the EU’s CSDP missions. Paul 
Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards hold, “The EU’s efforts are bound to be limited in scope, 
whatever the aspirations of some in Europe, even if only by the constant pressures on 
defense budgets.”162 
The challenges facing the continued development of CSDP are formidable. After 
taking account of national differences, divergent foreign policy objectives, and differing 
resources in defense budgets, an effective EU security and defense policy may seem like 
a distant dream. However, despite the complications mentioned above, CSDP does have a 
fair share of advantages. 
Many benefits of CSDP stem from the fact that it is not NATO, meaning that 
CSDP is not heavily influenced by U.S. concerns, can prioritize European interests, and 
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is not limited to “hard power” military solutions. As a unique security institution, with a 
full range of civilian and military capabilities, CSDP takes on a role that neither NATO 
nor any individual European nation could adequately fill alone. For example, EU 
enlargement may be seen by Russia as much less threatening than NATO enlargement. In 
a similar manner, a CSDP mission might contain less political baggage—at least in some 
circumstances—than direct NATO involvement. With the focus of the United States 
drifting away from Europe to the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific since the end of the 
Cold War, CSDP provides a security alternative for its EU members.163  If it were backed 
up by military capability investments, this independent European security capacity would 
not only strengthen the EU; it would strengthen NATO as well by indicating to the 
United States that Europe is taking its responsibility for security seriously. CSDP has also 
shown itself to be an extremely flexible tool, as seen in the variety of missions that the 
EU has engaged in. When Central and Eastern European countries began looking west 
after the Cold War, Zaborowski observes, “The most immediate security problems of the 
region…were to do with market access and ‘soft’ security issues.”164  The participating 
EU states have acted under CSDP auspices to deal with soft security issues, gaining 
experience in everything from police actions to migration and humanitarian relief. It is 
the EU’s ability and willingness to deal with these softer issues that set it apart from other 
security institutions. 
So what future role will Poland play in CSDP?  Zaborowski reminds us that, 
“Post-Cold War Polish foreign policy has consistently aimed to maintain a balance 
between its Atlantic and European dimensions.”165  But much has changed over the last 
25 years. Poland will no doubt continue to court American security guarantees. However, 
as Poland’s influence increases within the European continent, Poland’s loyalty may 
become more localized. Zaborowski predicts, “Poland’s Atlanticism is likely to recede 
whilst its sense of self-identification with the European mainstream is likely to grow.”166  
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If Poland concludes that its opinions carry more weight within the EU than NATO, it 
would be logical for Poland to favor more CSDP relevance and involvement in the future. 
As Poland continues to be one of the few European countries willing to increase their 
defense budgets, their prominence among EU nations will continue to rise.167  
Additionally, Russia’s recent aggressive actions in Ukraine have proven that Poland’s 
suspicious, though often politically incorrect, views of Moscow are accurate. As recently 
as 2010 Bobinski wrote, “Poland’s influence within the EU and its ability to secure its 
interest in internal EU matters is limited by a confrontational approach on Russia that 
tends to push the country to the margins of EU policymaking.”168  The Russian 
annexation of Crimea in March 2014 showed that the Polish assessment of Russia was 
right on point. This wake-up call may force the EU to prioritize its support for Central 
and Eastern Europe, a policy in which Poland will undoubtedly play a key role. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Poland’s road to EU membership was not easy, but the struggles required for 
acceptance into the European Union proved that Poland was committed to returning to 
Europe. Bobinski says, “If there was anything that ensured the Eastern Europeans’ 
smooth transition from the communist regime, it was the conditionality that the Western 
institutions imposed as the price for membership.”169  The pursuit of EU membership 
forced Warsaw to evolve on many fronts, including security and defense. Since 2004 
Poland’s role has grown alongside CSDP. Poland and the EU have created a new identity 
for themselves and are growing more assertive as their experience and confidence 
increase. 
Many questions still need answering. Will the EU and NATO learn to efficiently 
co-exist?  Will Russia feel threatened by this new EU role? How will this affect 
American relations with the EU? Will Poland ever favor an EU guarantee over one 
provided by NATO or the United States? 
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Poland’s second decade of EU membership and CSDP involvement may provide 
answers to the questions above. It is certain that peace throughout Europe cannot be taken 
for granted. A strong and secure Europe is a keystone to worldwide stability. As Russia 
threatens to disrupt this stability, politicians will need a variety of options to counter this 
aggression. The EU originally provided Poland with an option to rejoin the Western 
world. Now CSDP provides Poland with yet another option to secure its national 
interests. 
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IV. THE WEIMAR TRIANGLE 
As the Cold War came to an end, the world was forced to quickly grapple with the 
inevitable political implications. One of the glaring consequences that had to be 
addressed was the uncertain fate of Central and Eastern Europe. In a rare show of far-
sighted and proactive governance, France and Germany reached out to Poland to propose 
an informal structure of cooperation known as the Weimar Triangle. In this case, the term 
triangle may seem more geometrically correct than diplomatically accurate if it implies 
an equal relationship linking three actors, where any two sides can have a dramatic effect 
on the third.170  In reality, the choice of words was more a symbolic gesture toward 
Poland than a description of reality. Nevertheless, France and Germany decided that it 
was imperative to help reunite Poland with modern Europe. The forum has been in 
existence since 1991, yet it is still not very well known in Europe. Is the scarcity of 
headlines and news stories regarding the Weimar Triangle evidence of its 
ineffectiveness?  Or is this unique intra-regional relationship quietly reintegrating Poland 
into the West? 
This chapter analyzes the loose and informal coalition of France, Germany, and 
Poland known as the Weimar Triangle. The chapter also shows that the Weimar Triangle 
was able to achieve its initial goal of reintroducing Poland to Western Europe and, more 
importantly, that it has laid the foundation for becoming a driving force behind European 
politics today. Specifically, this chapter recounts historical milestones of the Weimar 
Triangle, identifies the different areas of cooperation within this trilateral network, and 
provides a realistic outlook on its future. In doing so, the potential for a new role for the 
Weimar Triangle emerges. In this new role all three nations can benefit from the 
partnership, and a bridge from an old Europe to a new Europe can be constructed. 
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A. HISTORY OF THE WEIMAR TRIANGLE 
In order to understand the extent to which the Weimar Triangle is capable of 
providing reputable and decisive leadership on the European continent, it is critical to 
understand the context in which it was formed. The Weimar Triangle was ushered into 
existence on 29 August 1991. On this day, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, 
and Poland came together in the town of Weimar, Germany, to officially proclaim a 
reconciliation between three countries with long and sometimes checkered histories. 
Although the Franco-German relationship has been stable since the 1963 Treaty of 
Friendship, commonly known as the Elysée Treaty, it was not until the end of the Cold 
War that a similar agreement could be extended toward Poland. The three Foreign 
Ministers—Roland Dumas of France, Hans-Dietrich Genscher of Germany, and 
Krzysztof Skubiszewski of Poland—understood the importance of integrating Poland into 
the European community and decided to champion the creation of this forum of 
consultation.171 
The city of Weimar and the date of inception of the Weimar Triangle are both 
representative of the Weimar Triangle ambitions. Weimar is a beautiful city located in the 
federal state of Thuringia. It is also the birthplace of the late Weimar Republic, which 
happens to be the name of Germany’s first, albeit unsuccessful, attempt at democracy. 
This attempt to establish an enduring democratic regime began with the convening of a 
constitutional assembly at Weimar in 1919. The dates of the initial Weimar Triangle 
meeting were 28–29 August 1991. Here is evidence of further symbolism. A renowned 
German poet, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, was born in Weimar on 28 August 1749. 
The importance of this shared date is affirmed by the cultural cooperation endorsed 
among the Weimar Triangle countries.172  
                                                 
171 “The Weimar Triangle,” Federal Foreign Office, last updated December 13, 2013, 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Europa/DeutschlandInEuropa/BilateraleBeziehungen/ 
WeimarerDreieck_node.html 
172 Mihai Sebe, “The Weimar Triangle – Between a moderate regional success and an uncertain 
future. Where Does It Come From? What Is It? Where Is It Going?,” SSRN Working Paper Series (02), 
(February 2011): 4–5, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1095322356?accountid=12702. 
 49 
It was in this picturesque setting on this historic date that France, Germany, and 
Poland formalized an arrangement with a specific goal in mind, mentoring Poland’s 
fledgling government in the ways of Western Europe. Specifically, France and Germany 
hoped to integrate Poland into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
eventually into the European Union (EU). In a 2011 speech during a Weimar Triangle 
award presentation, German Minister of State Cornelia Pieper said, “It was the declared 
goal of Germany and France, long viewed as the ‘motors of European Integration’, to 
incorporate the young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, and in particular 
Poland, into Euro-Atlantic structures. It is clear today that this integration has been 
entirely successful.”173 
The first part of the initial goal was realized in 1999 when Poland was able to join 
NATO. In 2004, in accordance with the Treaty of Accession of 2003, Poland was granted 
membership in the EU along with nine other countries. This milestone marked the 
achievement of the original Weimar Triangle goal. 
The partnership, however, did not dissolve, rather it aimed to redefine its purpose. 
According to Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, “In the expanded EU, the 
Weimar Triangle serves as a forum for consultations and developing common positions 
on key European policy issues.”174 
Critics have claimed that the Weimar Triangle has produced minimal results, 
particularly when it comes to resolving current European concerns, and that Poland 
would have likely joined NATO and the EU without any help from the Triangle.175  On 
the other hand, if it is recalled that this trio was never intended to be an institutionalized 
union, but rather a venue for the exchange of dialogue, a more positive portrayal of the 
partnership comes into view.176  As organizations such as NATO and the EU continue to 
expand their mandates and their membership, the role of the Weimar Triangle has the 
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potential to grow. It will be the responsibility of France, Germany, and Poland to define 
this new role and ensure its relevance. Today, the goals of the Weimar Triangle are as 
much geared toward cultural exchange and support as they are toward political trust and 
cooperation.177 
One encouraging sign of the continued importance of the Weimar Triangle is the 
number of key leadership engagements since its inception. The Foreign Ministers of the 
three countries have met twenty times over the last two decades. Their last meeting was 
held in Warsaw, Poland, on 23 June 2012. More importantly, the heads of state or 
government of the trilateral forum have convened eight times, most recently on 7 
February 2011 in Warsaw. During this engagement Polish President Bronislaw 
Komorowski, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
discussed such issues as the EU economic crisis, the then-upcoming Polish presidency 
within the EU (July-December 2011), safety and defense policy, and cooperation among 
scientific institutions.178  Aside from the importance of the topics discussed, it is critical 
to note that this was the first time the three heads of state or government assembled in 
over four years. The 2011 summit was a key step toward reinvigorating the Weimar 
Triangle. 
Despite the numerous state-sponsored events and meetings held by the tri-partite 
association, several glaring examples of missed political opportunities can be identified. 
Undoubtedly, the Weimar Triangle has failed to meet its full potential in recent years. In 
2003, a year before Poland’s accession into the EU, the leaders of the Weimar Triangle 
nations congregated in Wroclaw, Poland, and proclaimed support for increased trilateral 
cooperation, asserting that the Weimar Triangle would be vital in providing leadership 
and energy to an expanding European Union.179  Rather than using the momentum of 
Poland’s entry into the European Union to facilitate conflict resolution during a time 
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when Europe was looking for a strong voice, however, the three nations entered into a 
period of disagreement marked by exclusionary tactics. 
The first major point of contention came over the 2003 United States-led invasion 
of Iraq. Instead of attempting to mediate a common solution across Europe, France and 
Germany established their own nationalistic positions. As an additional affront to Poland, 
France and Germany looked to Russia for a shared view on the situation. This brought 
back dreadful memories of the 1930s to the halls of Warsaw. That same year, Franco-
German pressure was applied to Poland in regard to signing the European Constitutional 
Treaty. Although the treaty never came into effect, the behavior of France and Germany 
during this time confirmed that Poland’s position within the trilateral partnership was that 
of an unequal participant.180 
The forum has also failed to produce a consensus or play a key role regarding 
critical EU issues during the last several years. One such notable example was the double 
majority debate. This debate centered on the issue of reforming the rules of European 
Council voting. In short, the proposal was that the Council could pass legislation if it was 
favored by the majority of the member states and by those member states which have 
over 62% of the EU population.181  Poland believed that this reform of the voting 
structure would result in an unfair advantage for larger member states such as France and 
Germany. As a result, Poland opposed the suggested changes. 
Another missed opportunity for the Weimar Triangle occurred in the area of 
agriculture. The EU was embroiled in a prolonged debate over restructuring the Common 
Agricultural Policy, a compilation of agricultural subsidies and other programs 
introduced in 1962. Rather than taking a firm position and presenting a unified front, the 
Weimar Triangle was noticeably silent.182 
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More interesting than these apparent failures are the possible reasons why they 
occurred. Kai-Olaf Lang and Daniela Schwarzer of the German Institute for International 
and Security Affairs advanced the following theory: 
The main responsibility lies with the three governments themselves. Paris 
was fundamentally skeptical to eastern enlargement and showed no 
genuine interest in closely cooperating with Poland, the largest Central 
European accession country. In Berlin, ambitious plans were spelled out 
which were never to materialize. In Poland, which is traditionally the most 
“pro-Weimar” of the three countries, sometimes the domestic political 
situation made a strong European engagement difficult.183 
This analysis highlights the historical undertones resident within the Weimar 
Triangle. Another factor in the disappointments mentioned above may have been an 
honest assessment of capability. The choice by the Weimar Triangle to do nothing may 
not have been a choice at all, but a realization that the forum had no solutions to 
recommend.184  Fortunately, it seems that the three nations learned from their 
shortcomings. The 2006 summit convened in Mettlach, Germany, with a specific agenda. 
For the meantime, the Weimar Triangle set aside some of the harder European Union 
issues and instead concentrated on issues such as organized crime and migration.185  
While the topics were not the most ambitious, the meeting proved that the partnership 
could produce results when tackling the right problems, and this laid a foundation for 
future and possibly more aspiring engagements. 
B. AREAS OF COOPERATION 
With the lessons learned over the last two decades, the Weimar Triangle has the 
potential to influence future European decisions, but it in this time of resource scarcity 
the three nations must make a concerted decision to focus their efforts. According to the 
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, the Weimar Triangle countries concentrate on 
three areas of cooperation: political, interregional, and cultural.186  With these three areas 
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identified, the goal will be to move this partnership from a mere sounding board to a 
guiding power for the continent. 
Political cooperation will be a key to enacting changes with any sort of substance. 
Before examining how France, Germany, and Poland can effectively collaborate it is 
critical to appreciate the unique relationships between all three parties. According to 
Wolfram Vogel, “In order to better understand the motives of the Triangle’s foundation, 
it is necessary to look at the historical determinants of each of the three bilateral 
relationships. They have each developed a path dependency of their own that continues to 
influence the power relationship within the triangle today.”187 
The strongest of the three bilateral partnerships is the Franco-German tandem. 
France and West Germany began to rebuild their relationship, literally from the ashes of 
World War II, by 1950 under the guidance of the Schuman Plan. On May 9 of that year 
the European Coal and Steel Community was proposed. The ECSC would provide the 
catalyst for a renewed partnership between the two war-torn countries and the other 
participants in the ECSC (Italy and the Benelux countries). This agreement marked a new 
emphasis on supranational organizations and planted the seed for what is known as the 
EU today. Although driven by good intentions, each country had a secret agenda. France 
wanted to maintain some sort of control over Germany while at the same time directing 
the eventual reconstruction of Europe. West Germany was looking for a way to unify 
with the rest of Western Europe as an equal nation. By 1963 the bilateral relationship had 
solidified to a point that an official declaration could be made under the Elysée Treaty. 
Franco-German cooperation has since become increasingly institutionalized, evolving not 
only into a powerful joint arrangement, but also into a complex relationship within 
several multilateral organizations that is unmatched throughout the rest of the EU. With 
the Elysée Treaty as a common banner, the two countries are under constant pressure to 
find mutual ground on any serious topic that crosses their path. As these two countries, 
with often divergent political views, have worked toward compromise other states within 
the European Union have been inspired to cooperate as well.188 
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Another relationship with a great deal of history is that of Germany and Poland. 
Any arrangement between the two countries after World War II was overshadowed by 
the Soviet Union’s domination of Central and Eastern Europe, with Germany having 
been split into two states and Poland not really having an independent voice. The only 
significant development between the two countries during the Cold War was the signing 
of the 1970 Treaty of Warsaw, a German-Polish border agreement. Following the 
collapse of communism in Europe and German reunification, engagements between the 
two countries took on a renewed significance. According to Vogel, “In no other bilateral 
relationship is history such a powerful part of daily politics as in the German-Polish case, 
and it continues to be so.”189  From a civil perspective, a German-Polish Youth Office, 
mirrored after a Franco-German example, was established to promote rapprochement. 
Politically, the relationship was formalized in legal terms by the 1991 Polish-German 
Treaty of Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation. This treaty put to bed any 
lingering territorial claims that could sour future German-Polish collaboration. Currently, 
however, Poland has a hesitant arrangement with Germany. On one hand, Poland is 
fortunate to profit from Germany’s economic success and is grateful for Germany’s 
political guidance and support in bringing Poland closer to the West. On the other hand, 
at least in the eyes of some Poles, a Germany with strong economic power and political 
will can be seen as a threat.190 
The weakest bilateral relationship among the three Weimar nations is that 
between France and Poland. The lack of enthusiasm and emotion between the two 
countries may stem from the fact that they have never fought a major conflict against 
each other. Franco-Polish bilateralism does have a unique history in relation to Germany, 
mainly that of countering possible German aggression. This began in the sixteenth 
century and continued throughout the eighteenth century when the daughter of the then 
Polish King Stanislas Leszczynski married Louis XV. A line referencing Napoleon can 
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even be found in the Polish National Anthem.191  Unfortunately, the bilateral partnership 
during the 20th century was marked by ambivalence, culminating in France’s failure to 
aid Poland in 1939 and its subsequent neglect of Poland after the war. After 1989 the two 
nations found common ground again, predictably over issues regarding German 
reunification and border disputes; and they formalized their partnership in the April 1991 
Treaty of Friendship and Solidarity. Although the treaties that Poland signed with 
Germany and France proposed increased support in political, economic, and cultural 
development, neither of these arrangements was on par with the Elysée Treaty negotiated 
between France and Germany.192 
As these bilateral relationships within the Weimar Triangle continue to develop 
and interweave into the layers of EU organizations, each nation will find a potential 
increase in influence. Another way for the Weimar nations to exert influence in Europe is 
through their individual power within regional organizations. If animated with a common 
purpose, France, Germany, and Poland have the ability to guide regional discussions in a 
way that could establish a foundation for interregional consensus across the continent. 
For example, Poland’s position within the Visegrad Group (VG) provides an 
opportunity to shape Eastern European and Baltic policies. The VG, comprised of 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, is not a fully institutionalized 
association, but it has become a stable and influential voice within several countries that 
were formerly in the Soviet sphere. The economic market within the VG has expanded, 
even during the current EU crisis, and will provide the four nations more clout in political 
and security affairs.193 
As for France, it can focus its political will on molding a consensus among the 
smaller Mediterranean states.194  In a report of a seminar held in Warsaw in 2009, Olaf 
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Osica suggested that France has a keen interest in Mediterranean issues.195  Due to 
France’s geographic position, it has the ability to play a key role within this region and in 
organizations such as the Union for the Mediterranean. 
Germany, as a strong power within Central Europe, can influence any portion of 
the continent. It may have a special interest in the Benelux nations that could be 
cultivated.196  With the EU currently at 28 member states and likely to expand, even the 
strongest nations will find it difficult to effectively sway policy. A partnership like the 
Weimar Triangle provides increased political leverage. If the three countries of the 
triangle could bring with them strong regional support from smaller nations, the 
likelihood of agreement on a unified agenda in the EU structure would be greatly 
improved. 
Cultural cooperation is an area in which the Weimar Triangle has truly excelled. 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who was Germany’s Foreign Minister from 1974 to 1992, 
declared that, by choosing Weimar, the three countries “intended to show that this new 
Europe is more than an economic community, that what unites us is a shared European 
culture, to which all the people of Europe have made a great contribution.”197  The three 
states have developed several exchanges in areas such as education, youth organizations, 
art, and music.198  The focus has predominantly been geared toward young people. 
Students and artists participate in events such as the Weimar Youth Triangle congress 
and the Musical Weimar Triangle.199  Since the inception of the partnership, over 
100,000 students from Poland and Germany have decided to earn higher level degrees 
through the other nation’s universities.200  Results of cross-cultural programs can already 
be seen in Germany, where Polish is a popular foreign language, second only to English. 
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Finally, the Adam Mickiewicz Award, presented annually since 2006, recognizes 
individuals for their advancement of reconciliation and cooperation in Europe.201 
C. FUTURE OUTLOOK 
With an appreciation of the historical context in which the relationships within the 
Weimar Triangle have developed and an understanding of the areas of cooperation that 
are priorities for the three countries, an attempt to identify conceivable future efforts is 
possible. As these nations continue to cooperate, a realization that they are encountering 
similar challenges in the form of organized crime, environmental degradation, and 
negative demographic trends may well encourage a collaborative response.202 
The Weimar Triangle could play an increased role within the international 
organizations that all three countries belong to, notably the EU and NATO. Perhaps the 
trilateral partnership could even be the key to bridging the gap between the EU and 
NATO, especially in areas concerning security. In April 2010, the Weimar Triangle 
proposed a CSDP initiative that concentrated on reforming EU Battlegroups, establishing 
a permanent EU HQ, bolstering EU-NATO cooperation through tangible projects, and 
encouraging countries to collaborate on developing military capabilities to avoid 
duplication.203  This proposal was submitted to Lady Catherine Ashton, then the EU’s 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and helped drive Poland’s 
three priorities during the country’s EU presidency in July-December 2011: EU HQ, EU 
Battlegroups, and Pooling and Sharing.204  It is this type of consistent and unified action 
that is needed in order to get results within international organizations. 
Another opportunity for the Weimar Triangle to expand its influence is by 
broadening its own agendas. Rather than confining meetings to heads of state and 
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government, foreign ministers, and defense ministers, the Weimar Triangle could 
consider organizing regular meetings of representatives from other ministries. Finance 
and environmental ministers, both dealing with priority topics for the Weimar Triangle, 
would benefit greatly from gatherings designed to ensure that the three nations are 
consistently working toward the same goals.205 
A third role for the Weimar Triangle could be to increase the efficiency of the EU 
and NATO. Between these three countries and the regional influence they have, many 
difficult and uncomfortable topics could be first presented at Weimar Triangle meetings. 
The Weimar Triangle nations could “test drive” these issues in a much safer and more 
discreet environment, as opposed to the global stage that the EU and NATO operate on. 
The Weimar Triangle could act as a test bed for sensitive topics, gauging the possible 
reactions of other European states. In addition, potential problems could be sorted out; 
and France, Germany, and Poland could have an opportunity to develop a single voice 
prior to presenting specific issues to a larger forum. If this was done effectively, topics 
presented by the Weimar Triangle to the EU and NATO could be vetted and have a 
greater chance of being well received.206 
D. CONCLUSION 
As the Cold War came to an end, a difficult time came to a close. Unfortunately, 
what also culminated was, to some degree, a simpler time—a time of two superpowers 
standing toe-to-toe, with clear lines drawn and everyone knowing his place. The breakup 
of the Soviet Union brought with it political complications. International organizations 
such as the EU, NATO, and, to an extent, the Weimar Triangle now play a much more 
active and decisive role in global politics. As Poland has joined and participated in these 
institutions it has seen first-hand that these organizations and the relationships within 
them operate on several complex levels. This analysis of the Weimar Triangle—complete 
with its historical promises and disputes, acknowledged areas of cooperation, and hopeful 
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expectations for the future—provides evidence of the intricacies associated with these 
regional bodies. 
One answer to this multifaceted political conundrum may be the Weimar Triangle 
and comparable regional associations. Its lack of formal institutionalization, which could 
be construed as a problem, may actually be the recipe for its success.207  In a world that is 
growing increasingly more cumbersome due to widespread legislation and entangling 
alliances, a forum with greater freedom to maneuver and the credibility to discuss current 
issues in a less confined environment may be able to provide answers and a direction to 
an otherwise handicapped Europe. 
If Poland invests political capital and supports an appropriate agenda, the Weimar 
Triangle may find a positive place in European politics. Geographically, the three nations 
of the Weimar Triangle bridge the continent. Whether one sees this bridge going from 
West to East or new Europe to old Europe is inconsequential. The Weimar Triangle has 
the ability to help keep Europe united and to strengthen regional cohesion across the 
continent. In doing so, it will provide an example of political unity to all the states in 
Europe. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 Poland has decisively looked 
west for political partnerships, economic models, and strategic security. This thesis has 
examined how Poland’s decision to reintegrate into Europe, particularly through pursuing 
membership in key Western security institutions, proved to be vital in Poland’s post-
communist success. Since 1991 Poland has not only gained membership in NATO and 
the EU, but has also become a productive member within both institutions. During this 
time, Poland has grown from an inexperienced outsider eager for official affiliations with 
Western institutions to a confident NATO Ally and EU member determined to influence 
these institutions in pursuit of critical national priorities. 
Poland joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1999, but Poland’s 
membership in the Alliance was not a preordained outcome. The 2014 Russian invasion 
of Ukraine serves as a stark example of a nation that was unable to shed Russian 
influence and that did not join NATO. The disbanding of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 
allowed Poland to independently pursue a collective defense agreement in line with the 
country’s new national priorities. Poland immediately began to modernize its civil-
military relations as a foundation for the democratic reforms needed to become a NATO 
member.208  Poland’s ratification of the 1997 constitution provided the framework to 
solidify the progressive changes being made throughout the government. 
As Poland continued to implement domestic improvements and meet Alliance 
standards, the country participated in programs such as the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council and Partnership for Peace. By 1999, when Poland became a NATO member, the 
country was already well integrated into NATO operations. Poland initially could provide 
only a modest military contribution during the 1995 Bosnian crisis. By 1999 Poland was 
capable of bearing a larger burden in Kosovo, a responsibility which it continues to 
shoulder today. These two operations were instrumental in easing Poland into the 
coalition environment and helped prepare the military for its herculean effort with the 
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International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Poland’s leadership in 
Afghanistan distinguished it as a fully capable military power among the other Allies. 
This new credibility is what made Poland’s lack of direct participation with air or 
naval forces in Libya so noticeable. Poland’s absence from Operation Unified Protector 
in 2011 could be construed by some as discontent within the ranks of NATO, considering 
that Poland has always been a staunch supporter of Allied action. On the other hand, 
Poland’s decision to abstain from OUP involvement can been seen as a sign that Poland 
has fully matured. Poland stayed out of the Libya operation for domestic and strategic 
reasons, but in doing so expressed the confidence of a nation that is not afraid to take a 
stand and have its voice heard. Though Poland’s attitude on Libya may not have been 
convenient for NATO at this particular moment, having a strong and vocal member on 
NATO’s eastern frontier is an advantage. 
As Poland continues to grow into its role within NATO, the country will be in a 
prime position to influence the Alliance. With NATO’s drawdown in Afghanistan, 
political pundits and military strategists wondered what NATO’s new roles would be. 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 seems to have answered this question—
that is, chief among the Alliance’s tasks will be collective defense and deterrence. 
Poland, a long-time skeptic about Russian intentions, finds itself once again near the front 
line of Russian aggression. As the largest and most capable of the former Soviet satellite 
states, it will be up to Poland to take the lead in convincing NATO of this re-emerging 
threat. The potential for a future Russian threat is what initially drove Poland into the 
arms of NATO during the 1990s. It seems that the current Russian threat will now give 
credibility to Poland’s voice in NATO. 
Poland’s European Union membership came with its own set of hurdles. While 
NATO required Poland to adopt civil-military reforms, the EU demanded that Poland 
incorporate a sweeping array of political and economic changes spanning every major 
ministry of the Polish government. Some of the more contentious negotiations involved 
migrant workers and agricultural subsidies. As Polish domestic politics continued to 
mature and the EU acknowledged Poland’s potential contribution to the organization, 
both sides found enough common ground to formalize the relationship in 2004. 
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As the economic and political benefits of joining the European Union began to 
take effect throughout Poland, another possible benefit seemed to materialize. The EU 
attempted to broaden its influence by developing a Common Security and Defense 
Policy. This foray into foreign policy and defense developed slowly in the EU, not 
gaining much traction until 1998 during the historic Anglo-French summit in St. Malo. 
By the time Poland became an EU member, CSDP provided Warsaw with another 
security vehicle. 
Poland’s initial reaction to CSDP was cautious, because Warsaw did not want to 
support anything that might undermine NATO’s promise of collective defense. After the 
events of World War II it is no surprise that Poland would favor a strong U.S. bilateral 
relationship and decisive NATO competence over a newly formed defensive capability in 
the EU. Over time, however, Poland’s mindset has shifted toward a more balanced 
approach to CSDP.209  This pragmatic view is evident in the several EU missions that 
Poland has participated in and in the acknowledgment of the EU as a foreign and defense 
policy actor in the 2007 National Security Strategy and the 2009 National Defense 
Strategy.  
Although the EU, through CSDP, has played a more influential role in foreign and 
defense policy than it did before 1998–1999, NATO is still tasked with the supreme 
responsibility of collective defense for EU members that are NATO allies (such as 
Poland). The EU does not dispute this delineation. In fact, Article 42, paragraph 7, of the 
Lisbon Treaty clearly states: 
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with 
commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for 
those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their 
collective defence and the forum for its implementation.210 
History has proven that peace throughout Europe cannot be taken for granted, and 
that a strong and secure Europe is a keystone to worldwide stability. How involved the 
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EU can be in maintaining peace remains to be seen. The European Union originally 
provided Poland with an option to rejoin the Western world. Now CSDP provides Poland 
with yet another option to secure its national interests. 
From the chaotic collapse of communism in Europe emerged a rare example of 
far-sighted and proactive governance, an informal structure of cooperation known as the 
Weimar Triangle. NATO and the EU both sought to stabilize Europe by aiding, and in 
some cases, incorporating post-communist nations, though the sheer size and bureaucracy 
of these institutions—and political factors—limited the speed at which they could act. 
The Weimar Triangle, on the other hand, was established in 1991, with the simple goal of 
integrating Poland into Western Europe. This trilateral relationship between Germany, 
France, and Poland enabled Poland to more effectively pursue, and eventually gain, 
membership in NATO and the EU. 
In 2004, when the EU membership goal was met, the Weimar Triangle reinvented 
its purpose. With Poland’s reintegration into Western Europe complete, the Weimar 
Triangle provides a forum for political discussion and cultural exchange. Its lack of 
formal institutionalization, which could be construed as a problem, may actually be a 
strength.211  In a diplomatic arena that is growing increasingly more cumbersome due to 
widespread legislation and overlapping international institutions, a forum with greater 
freedom to maneuver and the credibility to discuss current issues in a less confined 
environment may be able to provide answers and a direction to an otherwise handicapped 
Europe. 
Poland has successfully integrated into three Western security institutions—
NATO, the EU, and the Weimar Triangle. The criteria for joining these institutions 
enabled a democratic transformation to occur throughout the Polish government and 
Polish society. However, the time of Poland’s transition is complete and the need for 
Poland to move from efficiency to innovation has arrived.212  Today, Poland is in a 
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position to help lead these organizations into the future. Poland’s geostrategic position on 
the continent ensures that Polish national concerns often overlap with European concerns. 
Poland, on the eastern frontier of Europe, is in a unique position to influence and guide 
NATO, the EU, and the Weimar Triangle through the current strategic environment. 
By examining Poland’s successful Westernization, a possible roadmap could be 
provided for other Central and Eastern European countries that are struggling to make 
similar political and military adjustments. Poland is in a position to act as a bridge to the 
east through its cultural links, shared history, and practical experience in the transition to 
Western institutions. Poland can serve as an expert and mentor in two capacities—for the 
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